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ARTICLE



'If it's not worth doing half-assed, then it's not worth doing at all': Police views as to why new strategy implementation fails

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ABSTRACT

Strategy implementation is the most challenging aspect of strategic management. In the case of police organizations, failure to effectively carry out a strategy results in loss of organizational resources and employee commitment. The present study is an attempt to explore the reasons behind failure of new strategies by drawing upon qualitative survey responses from 353 police officers and civilian employees from seven agencies across Canada. The results reflect mostly negative sentiments towards strategy implementation efforts, with failure attributed to issues ranging from leadership incompetence to lack of organizational resources. These concerns must be taken into account by police leaders in order to address challenges associated with strategy implementation in their organizations.

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Introduction

Ten things cops hate:

6. Any change whatsoever...even if it's for the better.

You want to hear a room full of whiners? Tell the cops they have to (insert new policy here).
Your earholes will explode... (Volent, 2015).

It is something of a truism within policing circles that police officers hate change and their environment is always changing. Research has long supported both contentions; however, the latter is not unique to policing. Most organizations experience the phenomenon of ongoing change. Such changes are well-documented and range from transformations related to globalization, the need for economic competitiveness, the effects of demographic shifts on work personnel and new technologies and innovations (Fullan, 2010; Spector, 2011). In the case of public sector organizations, change efforts have also been driven by the need for performance improvement (Ingraham & Lynn, 2004), which in the policing world has been tied to the rise of forms of public managerialism (Garland, 2001; Reiner, 2000). The prevalence of such changes confronting contemporary organizations has led to the surfacing of at least two key challenges. The foremost challenge pertains to the need for organizations not just to be aware of change but also to be sensitive to the need for change, whereas the secondary, and perhaps the most important challenge pertains to the need for organizational strategies that can lead to effective implementation of change (Self & Schraeder, 2009).

But despite the noted importance of strategy execution, most research has focused only on strategy development (Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2009; Hrebiniak, 2006) as issues related to implementation are often underestimated as being less problematic (Andrews, Boyne, Law, & Walker, 2011; Atkinson, 2006). Due to the paucity of information regarding implementation of strategy in the public sector, the topic has been likened to the ‘black box’ of innovation literature (Piening, 2011, p. 128). The present study attempts to fill this gap in the literature by exploring police officer perceptions regarding the history of strategy implementation in their organizations and the reasons behind the success or failure of such initiatives. Data for the paper were drawn from a qualitative question that was included in a survey completed by members of seven of police organizations across Canada. The results, based on inductive thematic analysis, are expected to provide insight for police leaders into issues related to strategy implementation and the measures that could be taken to improve the process.

Previous research on strategy failure

‘Strategy’ has previously been defined as a ‘broad-based formula to be applied in order to achieve a purpose’ (Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2009, p. 173) – a definition we use in relation to the present study. To provide greater context, we can also think of strategy as the means by which an organization determines how it will achieve its goals, and what methods it will use to achieve them (Johnson & Scholes, 2002). While strategy formulation may be seen as an intellectual as well as a creative exercise that entails analysis and synthesis, execution of strategy can be the most complex and time-consuming step in strategic management (Gottschalk, 2008). Literature in organizational change management suggests that most strategies, no matter how well defined, fail at the implementation stage if human and other organizational resources do not align with the objectives of the strategies (Atkinson, 2006; Brewer & Hensher, 1998; Klein, 1996).

Implementation is a management-directed procedure to enact organizational change, as well as the process whereby members of the organization can be persuaded to adopt and commit to change. It is an arduous task requiring much effort on the part of the management team in terms of introducing, monitoring and evaluating new service delivery models which are unlikely to succeed without organizational restructuring and redesign (Hill & Jones, 2008). Due to the complexities surrounding the process, Jenkins, Breen, Lindsay, and Brew (2003) consider strategy implementation to be a long and bloody battle with little chance of success. Gottschalk and Gudmundsen (2009) argue that strategy implementation is important for a number of reasons including the conservation of organizational resources, officer support for strategic planning, and establishing organizational priorities to ensure that organizational objectives are achieved. Implementation is a delicate task and may imperil the accomplishment of organizational goals if not handled appropriately (Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2009). Prior literature has identified several reasons for the failure of strategy implementation including a directorial style of management, ambiguous strategic intentions, conflicted priorities, ineffectual team of managers and ineffective upward communication (Atkinson, 2006). Others have also blamed inadequate resources, a lack of responsibility for implementation, and a lack of management support (Gottschalk, 1999; Self & Schraeder, 2009).

Failures of strategy implementation have a long term detrimental impact on organizations as they are not easily forgotten but become embedded in organizational memory. Whether experienced directly or through the narratives of other members, such incidents can lead to the development of cynical attitudes towards future change initiatives. Historical failures help construct resigned backgrounds, thereby giving rise to a discourse within organizations that pivots on the theme of ‘This probably won’t work either’ (Ford, Ford, & McNamara, 2002, p.110). Such conversations reflect a lack of optimism in the potential of the change to alter the status quo, irrespective of how much the members of the organization may desire the change or seek to believe in its outcomes (Reger, Mullane, Gustafson, & DeMarie, 1994). The unresponsiveness

created by resigned background resistance can be such that employees are likely to implement any introduced change half-heartedly, with little belief and commitment (Ford et al., 2002). It has been noted that employees are more likely to support future strategic initiatives if they are convinced of top management's commitment to their plans (Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2009) and the alignment between organizational resources and strategy over time (Brauer & Schmidt, 2006).

In the case of police organizations, the implementation of new strategies is especially challenging given their proclivity to adhere to conventional methods and approaches (Greene, Bergman, & McLaughlin, 1994). According to Schafer (2003), there are at least four types of issues that can obstruct strategy implementation in police organizations. These can be categorized as: (1) the reservations and qualities of the organizational members; (2) the climate of an organization; (3) the culture of the organization, and; (4) the process whereby change is implemented within the organization.

Of no little significance are the various factors related to demographics and attitudes, as these all determine how officers experience and respond to change in their workplace. But prior research has yielded mixed results regarding the impact of variables such as gender, race or ethnicity on officer attitudes (Miller, 1999; Weisel & Eck, 1994). Another explanation of the cause of implementation failure is offered by Skogan (2008) who points out that the likelihood of resistance increases when change is perceived by the officers to entail more or unfamiliar work, or when the benefits of this change are not clearly discernible.

Organizational climate is another factor of importance that shapes employee response to change (Schafer, 2003), and refers to employee perceptions of organizational policies and practices and behavioral expectations associated with them (Schneider, Ehrhart, & Macey, 2011). The idea of organizational climate is of great significance as employees who are at ease with the climate of their organization may be expected to respond positively to change and to display expected behaviors. If police leaders and managers make an effort to ameliorate communication in the workplace and establish participatory management, there is likely to be support for and commitment to the planned change and implementation (Schafer, 2003).

Organizational culture can also help shape employee responses to change (Schafer, 2003). It comprises of the values and beliefs that guide employee behavior and are based on the stories heard and leadership behaviors observed (Schneider et al., 2011) and can play a key role in facilitating the implementation of change within the organization (Zhao, He, & Lovrich, 1999). Especially in the case of police organizations, it is believed that implementation of change will fail if the organizational culture lacks congruence with the way of thinking necessitated by the planned change initiative (Mastrofski & Ritti, 1996).

A final consideration is to look at the manner in which a change initiative is planned and implemented within organizations in general and police agencies in particular (Schafer, 2003). Poor planning, lack of training and inadequate financial and material resources has been observed to be some of the major reasons behind the failure of change in police organizations (Sadd & Grinc, 1996; Skogan et al., 1999).

Employee perceptions of the efficacy of strategy implementation influences future commitment to new initiatives, however there is a paucity of research relating to the topic in police organizations. Obtaining such feedback would be valuable for top management in order to obtain 'buy-in' for future strategies by aligning them with the needs and expectations of those involved in strategy execution. The present paper addresses this gap in the literature by investigating police officer perceptions regarding the success or failure of strategy implementation in their organizations.

Method of inquiry

Data for this paper were drawn from an open-ended question which was part of a survey intended to replicate Telep and Lum's (2014) survey that examined receptivity to research among police professionals in Canada. To help us fully understand the factors that facilitate or impede receptivity to evidence-based policing practices, we included three open-ended questions in the

survey. Our present paper is based on one of the questions: 'In your view, how successful has your department been in implementing new policing strategies in the past?' This question was based on prior literature on organizational change and was expected to provide insights into the reasons behind strategy failure and how it impacts future strategy implementation.

Recruitment

The original Telep and Lum (2014) study was based on a sample of three police departments. Since the results of their online surveys yielded low response rates, we decided to survey seven organizations in hope of obtaining higher response rates. In terms of the selection criteria, we simply picked a major police service from each province that we targeted, which we felt would provide a reasonably large sample of respondents; as a result, the sampled police services tended to serve relatively large urban populations. Given the number of services that exist in each province within Canada, and the fact that these services potentially differ significantly from one another, the services we selected are not necessarily representative of other Canadian police services.

We approached senior leadership of seven municipal or regional police services across seven Canadian provinces through email. The provinces included; British Columbia (B.C.; $n = 23$), Alberta ($n = 105$), Saskatchewan ($n = 40$), Manitoba ($n = 160$), Ontario ($n = 74$), Nova Scotia ($n = 24$), and Prince Edward Island (P.E.I.; $n = 2$).¹ Participating agencies forwarded our request to their officers and civilian members for participation, and followed up with reminder emails before the close of the study.

Data collection

The Telep and Lum (2014) survey consisted of five parts. The first section explored officers' knowledge of both policing evaluation research and evidence-based policing. Section Two asked officers for their views of science and scientific research. The third part asked officers about their openness to innovation, including new techniques and strategies. Section Four explored views on higher education and its relative merits within the field of policing. The survey concluded by asking for demographic and institutional information. In our version, various adaptations were made to make the survey more applicable to a Canadian audience. Specifically, a question about ranks was changed and the three open-ended questions (described above) were added.

After receiving the consent to participate, we requested personnel at each site to review the survey questions and suggest changes if required. Two of the services requested additional minor changes. One request was to modify the rank structure to be consistent with the ranks used within that police service and another was to remove one of the survey questions. We were able to accommodate both requests as they did not affect our results and administered three versions of the survey, all including the open-ended questions.

The survey was posted online on 18 October 2016 and remained active until 15 February 2017. Respondents were informed that their participation was voluntary, that they would remain anonymous in any publications resulting from the survey, and that their personal information or responses would be kept confidential. They could also skip any questions they chose. In total, 598 individuals completed the survey. Of these, 353 answered the open-ended question: 'In your view, how successful has your department been in implementing new policing strategies in the past?' The present paper is based on the analysis of the detailed responses to this question and is discussed below.

Data analysis

For analysis, we used Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis approach which is a flexible, inductive method for qualitative data analysis. The themes are derived from data instead of being

Table 1. Sample characteristics – sworn officer or civilian.

Sworn officer	251
Civilian employee	52
Did not answer	50
Total	353

Table 2. Sample characteristics – gender.

Male	231
Female	77
Did not answer	45
Total	353

Table 3. Sample characteristics – age.

18–24	3
25–34	33
35–44	72
45–54	71
55–65	23
Did not answer	151
Total	353

dependent upon any specific or existing theories. The analysis involves repetitive reading of interview text and is therefore iterative in nature, meaning that it does not proceed in a linear fashion. For the purpose of ensuring reliability, one team member carried out the initial coding by reading and re-reading the interview transcripts. This was later verified against independently performed coding by other members of the research team and an agreement was reached regarding the final codes.

The next step involved open coding followed by organizing data into broader categories. The themes were then checked for accuracy and further refined and re-analyzed until a clear pattern began to emerge.

Sample characteristics

Our respondents included both officers ($n = 251$) and civilian employees ($n = 52$). We note that fifty participants ($n = 50$) chose not to answer (see [Table 1](#)).

Most respondents were male ($n = 231$) with seventy-seven ($n = 77$) participants self-identifying as female, and forty-five ($n = 45$) not indicating a gender (see [Table 2](#)).

Participant ages ranged from 22 to 62, with an average age of 52. As with other demographic questions, some respondents did not answer ($n = 151$) (see [Table 3](#)).

Respondents' number of years of experience in policing ranged from less than one year to 41.5 years. The average number of total years of experience was 18. Two additional questions focused on rank or occupational role (for civilians). Although all ranks including senior managers were represented, most of our participants were Constables ($n = 107$). Civilian employees included planners, supervisors, and managers, as well as intelligence, policy and crime analysts.

Results

As noted above, participants included in the present study provided an answer to the open-ended question described previously. Before moving on to analyze their answers to this question in greater detail, we would like to briefly present the initial results here.

As can be seen in [Table 4](#), the majority of participants felt their police service met with limited success in relation to implementing new strategies ($n = 158$). Ninety-seven ($n = 97$) participants felt their department was generally successful and seventy-two respondents believed that strategy implementation in their service had been largely unsuccessful in the past. We noted that most of the participants had provided sufficient detail in their responses to allow us to cluster the responses into seven themes indicating their perceptions of the reasons behind success or failure of strategies in their organizations.

In the remainder of the results section we will identify major themes that emerged through our analysis of respondent answers to the question: 'In your view, how successful has your department been in implementing new policing strategies in the past?' In essence, what these themes provide are insights into why it is that some strategies implemented by police organizations are only moderately successful or fail outright.

Lack of member buy-in

Perhaps not surprisingly, given the quote from Volent (2015) cited above, predominant among the themes identified is the issue of 'member buy-in.' This point of view was put succinctly by one of the two officers who believed their organization had been successful in the past in terms of strategy implementation. He explained: 'There is always push back when any new strategy comes into effect.' In light of such initial resistance it is also hardly remarkable that police employees are often slow to embrace change once it is thrust upon them. As one participant observed of his own organization:

Most new strategies would have a standard adoption and integration cycle reflective of a bell curve from early adopters through to those that are resistive. It is my perception that the individuals within our organization have a lower likelihood to quickly adapt and embrace change.

Without deeper study of this participant's particular agency, we cannot say for certain whether his organization truly is unique in this regard; however, we might surmise based on other responses that this is unlikely. Nor, again, is slow adoption of new strategies either a new phenomenon or somehow unique to policing, as evidenced by Rogers' (1962) work on the Diffusion of Innovation theory. In response to organizational change, Rogers identifies five types of 'adopters': innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority and laggards. Those who are slow to adopt changes, Rogers points out, are skeptical regarding the success of the initiative and commit to it only after success becomes evident. We saw some of this skepticism in comments obtained from our survey question (see also Mastrofski, Willis, & Kochel, 2007). Indeed, one officer candidly supported the traditional model of policing and derided newer strategies: 'Nothing in my opinion has as much success as old school policing. New strategies and implements have a way of making police officer lazy and become unknowledgeable to his or her general duties.'

Some participants ($n = 5$) attributed the lack of employee support for change to the perceived motives behind the initiatives. They were not convinced of the benefits of new change programs to the police organization and/or to society as a whole. Instead, they believed these were self-serving ploys for political gain. As one officer complained: 'Some programs have been clearly made promotional projects which have created programs that were not followed through properly. Some of the less effective or poorly managed projects create a sense of distrust of new initiatives

Table 4. Responses received.

Successful	97
Not successful	72
Limited success	158
Unsure/undecided	26
Total	353

amongst front line members.’ Another officer who did not believe his organization had a history of successful change implementation stressed the importance of team work, effective leadership and participatory decision making to ensure the success of change:

You have to have buy in from everyone within the organization, not pockets. To be successful we have to work as a team. At every level, we have to communicate, assist and support one another. Strong and respected leadership will have greater co-operation and implementation from all the members.

Another reason cited for the lack of employee support for change by a number of officers ($n = 7$) was the disconnect between top management and front-line officers which leads to decisions that are difficult to implement. Officers believed that little involvement from ‘boots on ground’ leads to the perception of increased workload, logistical issues and inconsistent application of strategies resulting in frustration and resistance among officers. One officer noted the deterioration of officer morale and motivation as a result of being excluded from decisions regarding the adoption of new strategies: ‘Officers are generally directed to adopt a new practice without providing the context for the change ... officers often fail to perceive that benefit and therefore show a lack of interest, frustration or even opposition.’ The same officer held police leadership responsible for the lack of success of intelligence led policing due to their stance on ‘political correctness’ which is seen as curtailing officer discretion.

Lack of communication

The participants ($n = 3$) who considered their department to be relatively successful in implementing change attributed this success to open and effective communication between organizational leaders and members. Lateral and vertical communication within the organization, information exchange across agencies, and engagement with communities, helps employees develop a sense of confidence in changes taking place. Acknowledging the fact that not all employee input could be utilized by management, one member nevertheless felt that ‘the appetite and encouragement to submit a new strategy opens members to provide ideas as well as ensures that members out on the street are always focused on applying new techniques to deal with a problem, hence think outside of the box.’

Not all of our participants viewed their agencies as being effective in communicating the rationale, necessity of, and/or strategies for effecting organizational change. Indeed, a number of them ($n = 5$) complained their organizations were not very effective in terms of information sharing, and considered this to be a consistent problem. They felt that new initiatives were implemented without explanation or consultation with employees on the front lines, which led to lack of officer support or enthusiasm. One officer speaking of strategy implementation in criminal intelligence units noted that ‘when these strategies are communicated to front line officers, there is often push-back and confusion.’ She believed that resistance arose from the inability of people to see the ‘big picture’, and/or to understand the reasons for implementing a new strategy. Similar concerns were expressed by officers from other departments who were convinced that change programs were unlikely to succeed without ‘proper reasoning/explanation’ and as another officer added, without ‘appropriate or adequate training or information sessions.’ An officer from a different service raised an important issue regarding lack of performance measures to gauge the effectiveness of pilot projects which he believed later resulted in ‘misunderstandings, and issues with adherence to rules of process and accountability.’ Due to the absence of feedback and communication regarding the outcomes of projects, doubts emerge regarding their effectiveness and organizational members are less inclined to support such measures in the future.

Leadership resistance to change

In analyzing responses, there seemed to be a consensus regarding the importance of police leaders’ willingness to truly embrace change as an underlying factor in success. On the positive side, we

noted that at least two officers seemed satisfied with their management when it came to the issue of willingness to meaningfully adopt new strategies. To illustrate: one lauded his leadership's proactive stance towards improving operations based on the results of municipal surveys. Another officer underscored the role of leadership in 'implementing and maintaining new initiatives' and stated that: 'Within the last 5 years, our agency has pulled together and now we are much more cohesive when we roll out new initiatives. I have seen a distinct togetherness that was not there before. This was due to a very able Chief that worked hard to bring everyone on-board to a handful of key ideologies.'

Conversely, other respondents cited lack of management support for change as a barrier to effectively implementing new and/or innovative strategies. Individuals within this group provided numerous examples highlighting the 'hunch based' and 'old school' style of work, which made their organizations, in the words of one respondent, 'very slow and resistant to adopt new strategies, and accept their usefulness.' Most officers ($n = 5$) complained about their leaders' reluctance to wholeheartedly commit to a new strategy, noting that, as a result, 'selling new strategies to front line staff is problematic.' Another officer expressed his dismay over lack of senior management support for initiatives despite the presence of credible research evidence. Yet another officer echoed similar concerns regarding her leadership noting that 'very few have the inclination or luxury to wait for evidence-based information to be collected or summarized from other research.'

Some of the officers ($n = 4$) believed that police leaders lacked the vision to appreciate the value of new policing strategies and focused only on immediate results. One officer held poor leadership and lack of introspection responsible for the increasing crime rates in his community. He felt the need to improve organizational practices instead of shifting the blame on external factors and added: 'New strategies and even old ones would be welcomed if there was good leadership.' An officer from another agency also stressed the need to educate the line staff regarding management's decisions to ensure buy-in and success of new strategies.

Losing motivation and direction

The two officers who considered their department successful in implementing new strategies in the past, often attributed success to their organization's ability to maintain a strong focus on strategies or 'utilizing target-based goals.' These individuals appreciated their organizations' efforts and agreed that continuation of strategies coupled with performance evaluation and feedback to staff were necessary to ensure the success of new initiatives. Carefully charting a long term strategic plan was considered important for a police organization to maintain focus and determine future goals. One officer noted that they were successful as they had 'implemented a "10-year strategic plan" outlining a 10-year plan to address issues faced by our department.'

But not all participants evinced satisfaction with their organization's ability to remain focused on long term plans. A few ($n = 3$) felt that police organizations were quick to implement changes but soon lost direction and motivation to follow through on measuring the results. As one officer commented: 'Implementation has been successful, the actions and results are less successful. We introduced Proactive Policing; however, after 2 years there haven't been any noticeable results or impacts.' One officer described his organization's efforts at change implementation as 'knee jerk reactions to events.' He seemed convinced that past attempts at change had failed due to lack of planning and vision by the management supporting 'arbitrary decision making and risk management over proven long-term solutions.' Another officer felt that new strategies receive a lot of enthusiasm from the executive level but the excitement diminishes as they reach the patrol members due to 'the practicality of implementation.' The officer further explained how members were over-tasked and unable to make time for new approaches noting: 'It can be difficult to find a balance between a new approach that "should" reduce call volumes and dealing with the fact there are 30 calls waiting to be dispatched in your division.'

Lack of resources

Availability of resources was considered an important factor for the successful implementation of new strategies. Unfortunately, though, we received no positive examples of well-resourced strategies. Instead, our knowledge of police views on this is drawn entirely from examples provided of situations in which strategies were not well-resourced. To illustrate: the majority of answers ($n = 8$) we received showed that police employees believed that new strategies had been adopted in the past without long-term commitment of appropriate resources such as manpower, leading to implementation issues. One blamed it on the 'bandwagon' effect where organizations are eager to join a trend but unwilling to make a long-term commitment, adding: 'If it's not worth doing half-assed, then it's not worth doing at all.' Another officer expressed her displeasure with change implementation at her agency, as follows: 'In my opinion as it became straining on manpower, reducing productivity, mental well-being and physical well-being due to the additional stressors added to our patrol branch and with shifting manpower, time off has been denied etc.' Similar concerns were expressed by an officer from a different organization who suggested that police services must first address current workload demands before committing to proactive and evidence based strategies.

Some officers ($n = 5$) believed that lack of resources coupled with poor planning further exacerbate strategy implementation problems. They felt that police organizations undertake new strategies only to appear progressive, but that new initiatives eventually lose momentum and organizational support (including the support of employees). Budgetary constraints further limit organizational ability to provide adequate training and professional development opportunities to its members involved in change which eventually results in reverting to old practices. Providing reasons for the failure of her agency's smart policing initiative, one police officer commented:

This was and is somewhat successful because the service implemented it without proper training, without IT support for computer issues, and utilizing an archaic computer system to track and count stats. There was a lack of formal training to our members and there was and is too much emphasis on the Hotspots; however, detective offices cannot get to or investigate hundreds of cases piling up.

Adaptiveness

As is well understood, policing environments are constantly changing – in some cases due to new innovations; more frequently, perhaps, due to external demands driven by dynamic social factors. Policing requires flexibility and a willingness to adapt as needed. Not surprisingly then, only two participants observed that change initiatives had been successful in the past largely due to their organizations' ability to adapt and modify strategies as and when required. The officers believed that flexibility to deal with change ensures the success of change initiatives and organizational survival in the long run. A participant stated that they had been 'very successful in implementing new policing strategies [at his organization],' as well as evincing a willingness to be 'constantly changing them' when required.

More frequently, however, participants ($n = 6$) argued that their agencies were slow to adapt, and, more importantly, quick to abandon a strategy when it was not immediately successful. This observation was framed as a lack of persistence in policy implementation that made organizations appear less than committed to long-term goals, and more focused on obtaining quick results to please external stakeholders. As a result, they felt that there was often insufficient time allowed for new strategies to take root. According to one officer: 'Knee-jerk reactions and strategies change with the revolving door executive office personnel.' This attitude reduces senior management's decisions to a mere 'flavor of the year', which one officer believed was something every new police Chief tried just to prove their leadership skills, adding: 'The managers of our department try and try but in the end. we are just keeping the dam from bursting.'

Not the right person for the right job

Another theme to emerge which failed to generate any positive examples centered on the need for police agencies to select the right people to generate internal change. Conversely, a few of the participants ($n = 3$) cited this issue as a reason as to why strategy implementations failed within their own organizations. Indeed, a repeated concern was over a lack of attention towards selecting suitable individuals to carry out specific tasks. For example: 'Too often members, including supervisors, are chosen by seniority or political alignment and not by a member's merit, ability, passion, or knowledge.' This same officer noted that new projects are undertaken which have the potential to generate public and media support, but are assigned to individuals based on tenure and not on knowledge or passion for the job.

Other respondents ($n = 4$) highlighted lack of expertise as a cause of failure in effectively implementing new strategies, which was seen as forcing police organizations to frequently repackage and present old strategies as new. In the words of one officer 'we are currently building a "Intelligence Branch" however personal agendas, career advancement, and terrible policy are road blocks.' This particular individual then went on to cite specific positions within his department that were held by individuals who he felt were insufficiently skilled for the task of driving change. Another officer blamed his organization for corrupting any police strategy by assigning important tasks, like community policing initiatives, to officers in the 'cartel' who did not actually believe in the value of such strategies. He was highly critical of the 'chosen group of officers, most of whom came up the ranks from the drug team, because it offers them experience for the promotional process.' In short, he believed that the implementation of strategy was used by some to make their resumes or work history experiences look better instead of serving an organizational purpose.

Discussion

Strategy implementation poses a significant challenge to organizations. This is said to be especially true in the case of police organizations that generally have a flawed record of strategy implementation (Schafer, 2003). The present study is an attempt to highlight issues that police employees view as causes of the failure of new strategies in police organizations. Our goal was simple: to highlight these issues, so they may be taken into consideration during future strategy implementation.

Data analysis based on 353 responses from an open-ended survey question yielded seven themes, each providing a clue as to why new strategies fail in police organizations. The first theme highlighted lack of member 'buy in' as a major reason for the failure of strategy implementation. The views expressed by the participants are consistent with the literature on the negative impact of lack of officer buy-in on the implementation of change in police organizations (Ford, Weissbein, & Plamondon, 2003; Greene & Mastrofski, 1988; Sadd & Grinc, 1996; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). Most of this resistance emerges from street level officers whose support for new strategies is impacted by the level of their involvement in the strategy development and implementation process (Novak, Alarid, & Lucas, 2003). Lack of ownership of change initiatives leads to superficial implementation and presents a clear challenge to the production of reliable evidence that can index what works in policing (Choi & Ruona, 2011; Famega, Hinkle, & Weisburd, 2017). It is therefore vital to attract and retain the support of those at the frontline, and in supervisory capacities, as they are most likely to imperil the process of implementation (Lum, Telep, Koper, & Grieco, 2012; Skogan, 2008; Weissbein, Plamondon, & Ford, 1999). Although resistance is expected, officer support can be secured by having their concerns addressed through leadership engagement over such issues (Coram & Burnes, 2001; Schafer & Varano, 2017). Allowing organizational members to voice their concerns, along with providing briefings and relevant training, encourages them to recognize the benefits of the new strategies and to ensure the success of change implementation (Buick, Blackman, O'Donnell, O'Flynn, & West, 2015)

A second theme was based on the lack of communication flow during change which leads to resistance to strategy implementation. The results are in line with prior literature on the failure of change implementation in police organizations due to the absence of communication and support throughout the ranks during change (Correia & Jenks, 2011; Raelin & Cataldo, 2011; Sadd & Grinc, 1996; Schafer, 2001). An appropriate system of communication, clear plan of action and consultation along with training is vital not only for effective strategy implementation but also for motivating officer support and commitment to new initiatives (Schafer & Varano, 2017; Stockdale & Gresham, 1995). Clarity regarding future direction and goals is important to reduce the uncertainty associated with change and to encourage employee buy-in (Buick et al., 2015; Fernandez & Rainey, 2006; Oreg, Vakola, & Armenakis, 2011). Such measures would prevent employee resistance to change arising from ambiguities and insecurities regarding the purpose of the initiative and its impact on individuals (Andrews et al., 2009). For police organizations to maximize the use of restricted resources it is also important that a thorough evaluation identifying success or failures of strategies be carried out. Efforts must be made towards measuring and monitoring interventions throughout the duration of the implementation process, including regular meetings with the staff involved (Famega et al., 2017) so as to catalyze learning and ensure support for the initiatives (Gottschalk, 2008).

Another theme centered on perceived lack of commitment to change on the part of police leaders, a factor that is seen as significantly undermining successful strategy implementation. Prior literature also suggests that the implementation of change in police organizations is the primary responsibility of top management and if the support of these decision-makers is not taken into account, the trial may become imperiled in the process (Raelin & Cataldo, 2011; Schafer, 2001; Schafer & Varno, 2017). Since leaders are responsible for creating an organizational vision and direction, their actions influence the attitudes and behaviors of employees during periods of strategic change (and beyond) (House, 1977). If leadership exhibits support for maintaining the status quo and discourages new ideas, it instills resistance to change among followers, which in turn guarantees the subsequent failure of strategy implementation (Oreg & Berson, 2011). To ensure the successful implementation of new strategies, key figures in the organization must act as change champions in order to gain the trust and commitment of the employees throughout the process and must be goal driven (Alarid & Montemayor, 2012; Schafer & Varano, 2017). Providing change related information to employees and convincing them of leadership's commitment towards change is especially important if past changes have failed due to lack of follow-through by leadership (Buick et al., 2015).

Study participants also believed that loss of motivation and sense of direction was also responsible for the failure of change implementation. Prior literature supports this finding suggesting that lack of planning and poorly defined outcomes result in confusion and derailment of the process of change in police organizations (Bradley & Nixon, 2009; Maguire & Katz, 2002; Schafer, 2001; Willis, Mastrofski, & Weisburd, 2007). Projects that are implemented only for the sake of following a trend or pleasing stakeholders are likely to fail, leading to wastage of precious organizational resources (Griffiths, Whitelaw, & Parent, 1999; McLeod, 2003). Adequate planning is therefore important as it helps avert adverse ramifications of change such as diminishment of worker enthusiasm and commitment or increase in skepticism and distrust (Gilmore, Shea, & Useem, 1997; Nutt, 1986). Change strategies must be crafted in such a manner that they focus on the achievement of specific goals while remaining flexible. Homel, Nutley, Webb, and Tilley (2004) suggest going beyond the basic planning process to ensure successful implementation of change in police organizations. This can be achieved by undertaking a detailed assessment of an organization's implementation capacity, conducting risk assessment of various options, creating flexible support systems and incorporating feedback loops to keep the employees informed regarding the outcomes (ibid).

Lack of adequate resources was another factor believed to lead to failure of strategy implementation in police organizations. This finding also aligns with previous studies which suggest

that the lack of human and financial resources during change can adversely affect the implementation process by giving rise to employee resistance (Alexander, 1986; Duxbury, Bennell, Halinski, & Murphy, 2017; Lum et al., 2012; Telep & Lum, 2014). One of the methods to ensure compliance with change implementation and allow change innovators to address potential pockets of resistance, is through training. Dissemination of the rationale and requirements of a change initiative can help reduce employee uncertainty, which in turn generates commitment (Drover & Ariel, 2015). Having a funding plan for strategy execution is also imperative for the success of change in police organizations (Gottschalk, 2008). Strategy implementation in police organizations is usually constrained due to budgetary issues and therefore requires careful planning and anticipation of possible issues before the launch of a new initiative.

An inability to adapt to changing environmental needs was also cited as a reason for strategy failure by the study participants which aligns with previous literature. Batts, Smoot, and Scrivner (2012) argue that unlike the private sector, police leaders do not have any financial incentive to institute change and adaptiveness which challenge the established traditions. But police organizations face the growing pressure to become more adaptable to the constantly changing external environment while maintaining internal stability. These organizations must also make significant efforts to develop a culture that rewards and values adaptability. Sometimes police leaders adopt changes haphazardly and without much deliberation, just to follow a trend (Bayley, 1988; Bradley & Nixon, 2009) which loses traction either with time or change of leadership without inculcating the value of adaptiveness (McLeod, 2003). Literature on organizational change suggests that despite careful planning, change does not always unfold as anticipated (Newton, 2002). Experiencing unforeseen challenges is not unusual during the course of change implementation (Greene, 1998) but what ensures the success of change is the ability and readiness of change managers to deal with such issues. Osborne and Brown (2005) argue that in order to generate the capacity for sustaining change, an organization must acknowledge and adjust to changes taking place in its external environment. This capacity to embrace change is referred to as an organization's dynamic capabilities, which are patterns of activity that enable modifications in routines to achieve effectiveness (Zollo & Winter, 2002). Developing such capabilities are essential for strategy implementation especially for public sector organizations like police, as they are faced with a greater external pressure to change compared to their private sector counterparts (Bryson, Ackermann, & Eden, 2007).

A final theme that emerged during data analysis was not having the right people assigned to deal with change implementation. Previous research suggests the importance of person-job fit or the congruence of an individual's personal attributes and job characteristics (Brkich, Jeffs, & Carless, 2002; Scroggins, 2008), which is related to their satisfaction and commitment to the job (Edwards, 2008; Meyer & Allen, 1997). In the case of police organizations, poor person-job fit leads to lack of motivation and has been deemed the main reason for attrition among new police recruits which may be as high as 25% (Orrick, 2008). Appropriate person-job fit becomes even more critical during the implementation of organizational change as the perceived self-efficacy to deal with new challenges greatly impacts an employee's attitude and support towards change (Caldwell, Herold, & Fedor, 2004; Niessen, Swarowsky, & Leiz, 2010). A lack of person-job fit is likely to lead to stress and negative attitudes during change which could impact the success of the initiative (Vakola & Nikolaou, 2005). Therefore, for the successful implementation of new strategies, police organizations need to incorporate strategic job analysis into their human resource functions to ensure that appropriate people are hired for the new, more challenging roles. While traditional job analysis focuses on person-job fit, strategic job analysis aligns current and future jobs with the organization's strategic direction and has important implications for the selection and staffing process (Singh, 2008). It enables the organization to select individuals with a broad skill base who are more adaptable to organizational changes and can be instrumental in successfully implementing organizational strategies (ibid).

Although our study yielded important information regarding the reasons behind strategy failure in police organizations, certain limitations may affect the generalizability of our results. First, the response rate was low which is typical of survey research conducted with police personnel. Secondly, our sample comprises a relatively small number of police departments serving relatively urban areas, which may not be representative of other police services across Canada. We would therefore recommend that readers exercise caution in interpreting our results as they cannot necessarily be generalized across the country or beyond. Another limitation may arise from having fewer civilian members in the overall sample, which did not allow for a comparison of views with the police officers in our sample. Lastly, self-selection bias may be a limitation as officers and civilians holding grudges against their organizations may have been more vocal in sharing their opinions regarding strategy implementation, potentially biasing our results.

Conclusion

Based on qualitative survey responses of 353 Canadian police officers and civilian employees from seven police agencies across seven different Canadian provinces, the present study represents an attempt to explore officer views on the degree to which new strategy implantation had been successful in their organizations. Although the responses were largely negative, respondents identified several key factors responsible past failure of strategy implementation which are likely to impact employee perception of the success or failure of future strategies (Ford et al., 2002). Officers believed that their organizations had been unsuccessful in implementing new strategies due to the lack of factors such as buy-in from officers; communication regarding change; leadership support; direction of change; resources; adaptiveness, and; person-job fit for change related projects.

Despite the limited sample size and geographical representation, our results have implications for police organizations as they highlight the importance of aligning human and organizational resources with the organization's strategic direction to ensure successful implementation of new strategies. This alignment would help police organizations adapt to the constantly changing external environment and the growing demand for performance improvement. Our results also contribute to the literature on strategy implementation in police organizations which has largely been overlooked by researchers in the past and is imperative for the success of organizational goals (Gottschalk & Gudmundsen, 2009).

The results of the present study also align with the few international studies available on the topic and can be useful for police agencies outside Canada. Studies conducted in the UK describe somewhat similar factors affecting strategy implementation in police agencies, ranging from the impact of external environment to organizational capabilities and resources that lead to the success and failure of projects (Harrington, Trikha, & France, 2006; Homel et al., 2004; Stockdale & Gresham, 1995). For example, Gottschalk and Gudmundsen's (2010) study of intelligence strategy implementation with police officers in Norway revealed that police organizational structures based on open communication and knowledge management are more successful in implementation change than those with bureaucratic structures. Similarly, results of a longitudinal study of a police department in Florida, United States showed that organizational flexibility along with a proactive, problem solving culture and material, as well as knowledge based resources, are instrumental in the success of strategy implementation (Santos, 2013).

Future research would benefit from surveying a larger and more representative sample of police organizations including rural, urban and suburban departments, and more civilian staff in order to improve the sample size and draw comparisons across employee types and agencies. It would also be useful to extend the research beyond Canada, enabling us to generalize our findings. Longitudinal studies observing new change initiatives from design to the implementation phase would also help confirm the findings of our present study.

Note

1. Since all participants did not choose to answer all the questions, the category breakdowns may not add to the total ($N = 598$).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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